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 BANKRUPTCY MARKETS: MAKING SENSE OF 
CLAIMS TRADING 
Adam J. Levitin* 
The creation of a market in bankruptcy claims is the single most 
important development in the bankruptcy world since the Bankruptcy 
Code’s enactment in 1978. Claims trading has revolutionized bankruptcy 
by making it a much more market-driven process. The limited scholarly 
literature on claims trading, however, while recognizing its radical impact, 
has either focused on doctrinal issues or used claims trading as a 
touchstone for the “Great Normative Bankruptcy Debate” about whether 
bankruptcy should be a market process or a safe-harbor from the market. 
The result is that scholarly treatments of claims trading have operated with 
a high level of generality and scant evidentiary basis. 
This Article argues that a more productive approach to claims trading 
must begin with a better understanding of its nuances. It shows that claims 
trading is a complex, multi-dimensional, and dynamic market with 
tremendous variation by timing, asset class, and trading motivation, and 
with different impacts on the bankruptcy reorganization process. 
Accordingly, the Article challenges the claim of Professors Douglas G. 
Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen that claims trading, along with other 
financial innovations, is detrimental to the bankruptcy process by creating 
an anticommons problem. The Article questions key assumptions underlying 
Baird and Rasmussen’s argument and suggests that rather than wreaking 
havoc on the bankruptcy process, claims trading might facilitate more 
efficient bankruptcy negotiations and help reorganizations. 
In the abstract, however, claims trading’s net social welfare impact is 
indeterminate, and empirical examination is not possible because of the 
incomplete nature of claims trading disclosure requirements, which expose 
only changes in legal title, not economic interest. Given the complexity of 
the claims trading market and our limited knowledge of its operations and 
impact, regulatory approaches to claims trading should be narrowly 
targeted and noninvasive. A start would be to improve market efficiency by 
increasing unsophisticated creditors’ awareness of their claims trading 
options and by enhancing price disclosure to market participants through 
mechanisms like electronic quotation bulletin boards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The creation of a market in bankruptcy claims is the single most 
important development in the bankruptcy world since the Bankruptcy 
Code’s enactment in 1978.1 Claims trading has revolutionized bankruptcy 
by making it a much more market-driven process.2 Instead of serving as a 
forum for creditors to negotiate a restructuring of the debtor’s finances with 
the goal of limiting their losses, bankruptcy is now a general investment 
opportunity. The development of a robust market for all types of claims 
against debtors has changed the cast of characters involved in bankruptcies. 
In addition to long-standing relational creditors, like trade creditors or a 
single senior secured bank or bank group, bankruptcy cases now involve 
professional distressed debt investors, whose interests and behavior are 
often quite different than traditional relational counterparty creditors. 
The changes wrought by claims trading have placed tremendous 
pressure on the bankruptcy reorganization structure set forth in Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code, which was drafted with a relational creditor world 
in mind.3 Because of the changes that claims trading has unleashed on the 
bankruptcy process, it arouses passions unlike any other issue in the 
bankruptcy world. Yet, in spite of this, claims trading remains a poorly 
understood and little studied area of bankruptcy. Although there are a fair 
number of legal decisions that touch on aspects of claims trading, only a 
few squarely address the key policy issues involved.4 Exacerbating this 
problem, only a limited number of scholarly articles that discuss bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Cf. Glenn E. Siegel, Introduction: ABI Guide to Trading Claims in Bankruptcy: ABI 
Committee on Public Companies and Trading Claims (pt. 2), 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 177, 
177 (2003) [hereinafter Siegel, Part 2] (“Perhaps nothing has changed the face of bankruptcy in 
the last decade as much as the newfound liquidity in claims.”). 
 2. Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate 
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 104 (1995) (claims trading “epitomizes the 
development of markets in connection with bankruptcy”). 
 3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1–1532 (2006). 
 4. See, e.g., Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, L.P. (In re Enron Corp.), 340 
B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C. (In re 
Enron Corp.), 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, L.P. 
(In re Enron Corp.), 333 B.R. 205, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Viking Assocs., L.L.C. v. Drewes 
(In re Olson), 120 F.3d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1997) (under FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e), a court may 
not reduce the allowed amount of a claim to the amount paid by a claims buyer unless objected to 
by the transferor); Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. (In re Figter), 118 F.3d 
635 (9th Cir. 1997); In re First Humanics Corp., 124 B.R. 87, 92 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (claims 
purchase by debtor’s former management company to gain standing to file a plan to protect 
interest of the debtor was in good faith); In re Applegate Prop. Ltd., 133 B.R. 827, 836 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tex. 1991) (designating votes of an affiliate of the debtor that purchased a blocking position 
to thwart a creditor’s plan because it was done in bad faith); In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 118 B.R. 
282, 289–90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (because of bad faith activities, the court designated votes of 
a claims purchaser who purchased to get a blocking position on a plan). 
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claims trading.5 The existing literature tends to focus on doctrinal issues 
created by claims trading, contains no discussion of the market mechanisms 
for claims trading and rarely delves into the differences among the varied 
trading practices that fall under the rubric of “claims trading.” Put another 
way, the limited literature on claims trading generally does not engage with 
claims trading’s realities. 
Instead, claims trading is often used as a totem for a larger normative 
debate about bankruptcy: What interests should be served by bankruptcy 
policy? What relative weight should be placed on concerns of efficiency 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396827; Kevin J. Coco, 
Empty Manipulation: Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019 and Ownership Disclosure in Chapter 11 
Cases, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 610 (2008) (discussing problems of claims trading and empty 
voting); Joy Flowers Conti, Raymond F. Kozlowski, Jr., & Leonard S. Ferleger, Claims 
Trafficking in Chapter 11— Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 281 (1992); 
Thomas Donegan, Note, Covering the “Security Blanket”: Regulating Bankruptcy Claims and 
Claim-Participations Trading Under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 381 
(1998); Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the Federal 
Securities Laws?, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 569 (2002); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers 
Mayer, Developments in Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 13 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1991–92); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Developments in 
Trading Claims: Participations and Disputed Claims, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 733 (1993) (exploring 
the problems created by “participation” interests in claims trading); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas 
Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1 (1990–91) [hereinafter Fortgang & Mayer, Trading Claims]; Paul M. Goldschmid, 
Note, More Phoenix than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191 (2005) (arguing for the positive role of 
distressed debt investors in reorganizations); Geoffrey Groshong, Trading Claims in Bankruptcy: 
Debtor Issues, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 625 (2002); Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate 
Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 703 (2008); Adam J. Levitin, Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the Virtues of Negotiability in 
the Wake of Enron, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 83, 89 (2007) [hereinafter Levitin, Finding 
Nemo]; Adam J. Levitin, The Limits of Enron: Counterparty Risk in Bankruptcy Claims Trading, 
15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 389 (2006) [hereinafter Levitin, The Limits of Enron]; W. Andrew P. 
Logan III, Note, Claims Trading: The Need for Further Amending Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 3001(e)(2), 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 495 (1994); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 
Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987 (2002); Harvey R. Miller 
& Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed 
Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153 (2004) [hereinafter Miller & 
Waisman, Twenty-First Century]; Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 
Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129 (2005) [hereinafter Miller & Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?] 
(criticizing the effects of distressed debt investors on the Chapter 11 process); Guy B. Moss, The 
Risks of Purchasing and Collecting Consumer Debt, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 643 (2002); 
Glenn E. Siegel, Introduction: ABI Guide to Trading Claims in Bankruptcy: ABI Committee on 
Public Companies and Trading Claims (pt. 1), 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 567 (2002) 
[hereinafter Siegel, Part 1]; Siegel, Part 2, supra note 1; Frederick Tung, Confirmation and 
Claims Trading, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1684 (1996) (considering the benefits and problems of claims 
trading in the plan confirmation context); Michael H. Whitaker, Note, Regulating Claims Trading 
in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: A Proposal for Mandatory Disclosure, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 303 (1994). 
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and distributional fairness?6 Should bankruptcy merely be a procedural 
extension of the market or is it a safe-harbor from the market in which other 
values and interests are expressed? This Great Normative Bankruptcy 
Debate has focused on claims trading because it has been the leading factor 
in the marketization of bankruptcy. 
This Article argues that it is unproductive to understand claims trading 
through the lens of the Great Normative Bankruptcy Debate. Burdening 
consideration of claims trading with the weight of this overarching policy 
debate has prevented a serious engagement with actual practice of claims 
trading. Instead, claims trading is frequently treated as a generic and 
stylized phenomenon, divorced from its more nuanced operation in practice. 
This Article disaggregates the wide variety of investment practices that 
fall under the rubric of claims trading. It argues that claims trading is 
actually comprised of several overlapping and evolving markets that vary 
on dimensions of timing and asset class. These different markets have 
distinct mechanisms and distinct risks for buyers and sellers who are moved 
by a variety of motivations. 
An examination of these markets shows that claims trading has cross-
cutting impacts on the bankruptcy process with a net impact that is 
indeterminate on the available evidence. Accordingly, claims trading is not 
well-suited for broad policy reforms. Instead, at this point, we can merely 
identify several modest features of the claims trading market that can be 
improved. 
Part I of this Article connects the bankruptcy claims trading debate to 
the Great Normative Bankruptcy Debate and observes two problems that 
plague discussions of bankruptcy claims trading: a scant evidentiary basis 
and a high level of generality. Part II shows how claims trading is a 
multidimensional and dynamic market with tremendous variation by timing, 
asset class, and trading motivation. It demonstrates how some claims 
trading may be beneficial or neutral, while other trading activities are more 
problematic. This suggests that any regulatory approaches to claims trading 
should be narrowly targeted so as not to throw out the proverbial baby with 
the bathwater. 
Part III considers an argument recently articulated by Douglas G. Baird 
and Robert K. Rasmussen (Baird and Rasmussen) that implicates claims 
trading, in general, along with other financial innovations, as detrimental to 
                                                                                                                 
 6. It is also possible to add in concerns of administrability. In the bankruptcy context, 
however, administrability is ultimately a question of efficiency and distribution. A case that is 
hard to administer takes longer and is more expensive, and the costs from the delay are borne by 
the residual claimant(s). For a discussion on the difficulty in identifying residual claimants, see 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 
1342 (2004). 
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the bankruptcy process.7 Baird and Rasmussen point to claims trading as 
contributing to an anticommons problem that reduces the effectiveness of 
bankruptcy as a procedural tool for resolving the collective action problem 
of the race to the courthouse. Part III questions key assumptions underlying 
Baird and Rasmussen’s argument and suggests that rather than wreaking 
havoc on the bankruptcy process, claims trading may actually facilitate 
more efficient bankruptcy negotiations and help reorganizations. Part IV 
concludes with some suggestions for improving the claims trading market. 
I. CLAIMS TRADING AND THE GREAT NORMATIVE 
BANKRUPTCY DEBATE 
A. A TAXONOMY OF NORMATIVE VIEWS OF BANKRUPTCY 
Over a decade ago, Douglas Baird mapped the world of bankruptcy 
scholarship as roughly divided into two loose camps: Traditionalists and 
Proceduralists.8 As Baird explained: 
The [T]raditionalists believe that bankruptcy law serves an important 
purpose in rehabilitating firms that, but for bankruptcy protection, would 
fail. Jobs would be lost and communities damaged, economically and 
otherwise, if the protections that bankruptcy law provides were 
unavailable. By contrast, the [P]roceduralists deny that bankruptcy can 
work any special magic. Firms must live or die in the market. All 
bankruptcy can do is ensure that fights among creditors and other 
investors of capital do not accelerate a firm’s liquidation. For them, one 
does more harm than good by doing anything more to protect a firm from 
the forces of the market.9 
The division that Baird finds in the scholarship is also a different view 
of what bankruptcy’s relationship to the market process should be. Should 
bankruptcy be a part of or apart from the market? Is bankruptcy merely an 
extension of the market or a safe haven from it? 
Ultimately, the camps diverge on the question of whether markets can 
be relied upon to produce optimal outcomes. Are markets always the 
answer? Traditionalists are more skeptical of markets than Proceduralists.10 
Part of this skepticism is both expressed in and a function of how optimal 
outcomes are defined. Traditionalists, who often work on consumer 
bankruptcy issues, look at net social outcomes, while Proceduralists, who 
tend to focus on corporate reorganizations, focus on the firm, in keeping 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 6, 33). 
 8. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 576 (1998). 
 9. Id. at 577–78. 
 10. There is a strange tension between the Proceduralist view of bankruptcy as a solution to a 
market failure due to a collective action problem and Proceduralists’ willingness to generally rely 
on a market they recognize as fallible. 
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with a long tradition of exclusively firm-focused corporate law 
scholarship.11 While many variations exist in these camps, it still remains a 
remarkably accurate intellectual cartography of the bankruptcy world. 
B. NORMATIVE VIEWS OF BANKRUPTCY AND THE CLAIMS TRADING 
DEBATE 
Baird’s taxonomy has remarkable explanatory power for understanding 
the debate about claims trading. Arguments being made against claims 
trading are very much Traditionalist arguments, while arguments being 
made for claims trading are Proceduralist arguments. For example, Harvey 
Miller, perhaps the leading practitioner advocate of the rehabilitation view 
of business bankruptcy, has argued that: 
Distressed debt trading and changes in bankruptcy relationships have 
destroyed the symbiotic relationship of debtor and creditor . . . . Because 
Chapter 11 is premised upon a symbiotic relationship between debtor and 
creditor, it is becoming less effective in the context of distressed debt 
trading.12 
Miller contends that the failure rate of large Chapter 11 cases is due in 
part to claims trading, as “distressed debt traders may sacrifice the long-
term viability of a debtor for the ability to realize substantial and quick 
returns on their investments.”13 Similarly, Fredrick Tung has argued that 
claims trading upsets the community of interests involved in bankruptcy.14 
Others have maintained that claims trading merely provides a 
mechanism for creditors to move in or out of this community.15 They argue 
that “distressed-debt investors generally have a salutary impact on the 
residual actor problem of bankruptcy by expediting business 
reorganizations and protecting going-concern enterprise values”16 or that 
“courts should encourage, rather than interfere with, the market in order to 
facilitate the significant benefits claims trading offers in bankruptcy.”17 
In this light, it is worth considering the standard arguments about 
claims trading. These arguments in favor of claims trading are about 
efficiency and markets: 
 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout 
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1122–23 
(2009). 
 12. Miller, supra note 5, at 2014–15. 
 13. Id. at 2016. 
 14. Tung, supra note 5, at 1718. 
 15. See, e.g., Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 87 (“The ability to sell bankruptcy 
claims provides an exit opportunity for creditors who do not wish to incur the hassle and expense 
of the reorganization process.”). 
 16. Goldschmid, supra note 5, at 193. 
 17. Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 2, at 104. 
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1) Claims trading allows an exit for those creditors who want to 
cut loose from the bankruptcy process because of liquidity 
constraints,18 administrative hassle and expense,19 regulatory 
risk,20 to avoid an adversarial relationship with the debtor,21 or 
to establish a tax loss.22 There are significant risks, costs, and 
delays inherent in bankruptcies. Payouts are speculative and 
can take years to receive.23 Selling a claim allows a creditor to 
“cash out” at a certain price. 
2) Claims trading permits an entrance to the bankruptcy process 
for those investors who want to take the time and effort to 
monitor the debtor and contribute expertise to the 
reorganization process.24 
3) Claims trading increases liquidity overall in capital markets and 
lowers the cost of credit as the option of avoiding the 
uncertainty of being a creditor in bankruptcy increases the risk 
tolerance of originating lenders.25 
4) Claims trading reduces transaction costs in the plan negotiation 
process by consolidating dispersed claimholders into a few 
large claimholders.26 
5) Claims trading reduces the administrative costs of bankruptcies 
by speeding up the reorganization negotiation process through 
consolidation of claimholders.27 
6) Claims trading creates a market for control in bankruptcy that 
might not exist absent a cramdown plan or a § 363 sale.28 
                                                                                                                 
 18. In re Kreisler, 546 F.3d 863, 864 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Claims trading allows creditors to opt 
out of the bankruptcy system, trading an uncertain future payment for an immediate one, so long 
as they can find a purchaser.”). 
 19. Goldschmid, supra note 5, at 206. 
 20. See Drain & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 575. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.; see also Goldschmid, supra note 5, at 206. 
 23. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 13). 
 24. Id. at 40; see also Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the 
Market for Control of Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 401 (1997) (finding that “vulture 
investors add value by disciplining managers of distressed firms”); Wei Jiang et al., Hedge Funds 
in Chapter 11 32 (Nov. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1493966 (“The prevalence of hedge funds contributes to the 
trend toward a more management-neutral restructuring process, and is viewed by the market as 
enhancing the overall value of bankrupt firms.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 89; Drain & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 
575. 
 26. See, e.g., Drain & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 575–76. 
 27. William Beranek & Steven L. Jones, The Emerging Market for Trade Claims of Bankrupt 
Firms, 23 FIN. MGMT. 76, 76, 79 (1994). 
 28. David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 
11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 921 (2003) (noting that “claims trading sometimes simulated a market 
for corporate control”). 
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7) Claims trading can result in a higher and/or quicker return for 
creditors because it imposes market discipline on debtors.29 If a 
reorganization is being run poorly, creditors will sell their 
claims, and the buyers will either push for a liquidation or 
attempt to take control of the reorganization.30 
 
Three more arguments not found in the literature might be added to the 
arguments above. First, claims trading ensures more efficient allocations of 
capital in the market by permitting entry and exit, which lets parties express 
their idiosyncratic valuations. Second, claims trading can facilitate 
reorganizations by bringing in parties who are willing and able to contribute 
the fresh capital needed to fund the reorganization process (Debtor in 
Possession (DIP) financing) and the newly reorganized company (exit 
financing). And third, claims trading may facilitate more sustainable 
reorganizations by enabling firms to emerge with lower leverage ratios. 
Banks are generally prohibited from holding equity in non-financial 
operating companies.31 Therefore, bank creditors want their claims paid 
either in cash or in debt of the reorganized company. This either makes 
reorganization harder by requiring more cash on hand or adds to the debt 
burden of the reorganized firm, making the reorganization less sustainable 
and (all else being equal) increasing the likelihood of a refiling (a so-called 
Chapter 22). 
Claims trading enables the replacement of bank creditors with hedge 
funds and private equity funds,32 which are able, and often eager, to take 
equity in the reorganized company.33 Thus, claims trading facilitates a shift 
in the composition of creditors that allows more flexibility in reorganizing 
and promotes more sustainable reorganizations.34 
These arguments emphasize efficiency gains both in bankruptcy and in 
the capital markets from claims trading. This contrasts with the arguments 
against claims trading, which raise countervailing efficiency concerns, as 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 575–76. 
 30. Thus, claims trading could result in a positive externality on creditors who do not trade but 
instead free-ride on the market discipline of the traders. 
 31. Bank holding companies are unable to hold equity in firms whose activities are not “so 
closely related to banking as to be a proper incident thereto.” 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2006); cf. 12 
C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2) (2009) (providing limitations on national banks’ operating subsidiaries). 
 32. Banks are more likely than hedge funds and private equity funds to have relationships with 
operating firms and originate loans. 
 33. For example, a hedge fund that purchases a claim at thirty cents on the dollar and gets paid 
out forty-five cents on the dollar in cash and new debt will likely be happy to take an equity piece 
as well and capture the potential upside of the firm (which is greater if the firm has manageable 
debt service). 
 34. Banks also prefer payouts in debt rather than equity in order to protect themselves in the 
event of a refiling and because debt would boost their earnings per share (EPS). EPS is not a 
relevant performance metric for hedge funds and private equity funds, so they are less driven by 
earnings. 
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well as concerns about procedural and distributional fairness, not just within 
the bankruptcy, but also to a larger community of interests: 
 
1) Claims trading hinders bankruptcy plan negotiations by raising 
transaction costs of negotiation because the identity of creditors 
is churning, which makes it hard to lock in a deal.35 The delay 
imposes an externality on creditors who do not trade and 
reduces the value of the debtor’s estate.36 
2) Claims trading enables greenmail, insider trading, and other 
unfair practices that allow particular creditors to extract surplus 
rents.37 
3) Claims trading hurts unsecured creditors by making it harder to 
find creditors willing and able to serve on committees. Many 
creditors will not serve on committees because they wish to 
remain unrestricted for trading purposes, while others have 
purchased claims up and down the capital structure, and 
therefore, have conflicts of interest that preclude them from 
serving.38 
4) Claims trading encourages participation of creditors who value 
short-term returns on trades and quick monetization over the 
long-term value and viability of the debtor company.39 This can 
lead to deadweight loss through the destruction of going 
concern value and can lead to recidivism among debtors.40 The 
loss often has externalities on non-creditor community interests 
affected by bankruptcies.41 
5) Claims trading destroys the “symbiotic relationship of debtor 
and creditor” that is the premise of Chapter 11.42 
The arguments about claims trading roughly track the normative bankruptcy 
scholarship divide identified by Baird.43 Arguments in support of claims 
trading favor letting the market guide reorganizations, while the arguments 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 50). 
 36. The externality can include the loss of valuable net operating losses (NOLs) if the turnover 
in ownership is too high. See 26 U.S.C. § 382(l)(5) (2006). 
 37. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 50). 
 38. See, e.g., Eric B. Fisher & Andrew L. Buck, Hedge Funds and the Changing Face of 
Corporate Bankruptcy Practice, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.–Jan. 2007, at 24, 87. 
 39. See, e.g., Miller & Waisman, Twenty-First Century, supra note 5, at 181; Miller, supra 
note 5, at 2016 (“distressed debt traders may sacrifice the long-term viability of a debtor for the 
ability to realize substantial and quick returns on their investments”); Harner, supra note 5. 
 40. Miller & Waisman, Twenty-First Century, supra note 5, at 182; Miller & Waisman, Is 
Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, supra note 5, at 153. 
 41. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 336, 336–42 (1993) (suggesting various distributional goals besides economic efficiency). 
 42. Miller, supra note 5, at 2014. 
 43. Baird, supra note 8. 
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against are skeptical of the market producing either efficient or fair results 
for the community of interests involved in a bankruptcy. 
All of these arguments operate on a very high level of generality. The 
standard arguments about claims trading focus on whether claims trading 
should or should not be allowed. They are not arguments for regulating 
claims trading, but are instead arguments about it being either a positive or 
negative phenomenon.  
This binary divide makes little sense, however. Are critics of claims 
trading really calling for an end to all claims trading or merely for some 
regulation of it? Are advocates of claims trading arguing for it to remain a 
virtually unregulated market, or simply arguing for claims trading to 
continue in some form? To date, no one seems to have called for an outright 
ban on claims trading. When pressed, proponents of claims trading will 
usually concede the need for some reforms in the market to curb such 
abuses as claims laundering, greenmail, insider trading, or to protect 
unsophisticated trade creditors.44 
When confronted with claims trading as an actuality, rather than as a 
way for expressing normative views on bankruptcy policy, the binary 
arguments collapse into a spectrum of more regulation to less regulation. 
This spectrum, however, contains relatively few regulatory proposals. To 
the extent that arguments about claims trading are really about claims 
trading, rather than a normative vision of bankruptcy, it has a thin 
evidentiary basis which forces claims trading to be addressed in a highly 
generalized manner.45 These features limit the debate to being little more 
than an imperfect battleground for the Great Normative Bankruptcy Debate. 
C. THE THIN EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE CLAIMS TRADING 
DEBATE 
The debate over claims trading operates on a limited evidentiary base. 
Arguments about claims trading are based on theory, common sense, and 
anecdote, but not data. Empirically, we know relatively little about claims 
trading. What is the volume of claims trades in number? In amount? What 
percentage of claims change hands? How frequently do claims trade? Who 
buys and who sells? How many discrete buyers are there? How many are 
prepetition creditors? Does trading result in a consolidation or dispersal of 
holdings and to what degree? How much variation is there by case? By 
asset class? By timing within a case? By type of debtor? How does the 
pricing change over time? How accurate of a predictor of plan payouts is 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See generally Conti, Kozlowski & Ferleger, supra note 5, at 287, 296, 299 (discussing 
specific claims trading abuses and the need for reform through proper disclosure). 
 45. Notable exceptions are: Baird & Rasmussen; supra note 5; Drain & Schwartz, supra note 
5; Goldschmid, supra note 5; Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5; and Levitin, The Limits of 
Enron, supra note 5. 
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the claims market? And how does this all compare to distressed debt trading 
on the doorstep of bankruptcy? 
No one has a handle even on the most elementary questions like the size 
of the bankruptcy claims trading market, either in terms of face value of 
claims trading hands or the volume of transactions. There is broad 
consensus that there is a large and growing market in claims. Academic 
articles place the market at hundreds of billions.46 One company attempting 
to create an exchange in trade claims estimates this piece of the market to 
be worth $75 billion.47 It is not clear what that number is actually 
measuring—total par value of claims, total amounts paid for claims, etc. 
Moreover, it is unclear how anyone could arrive at any number. The data 
simply does not exist. 
The reason that we do not know the extent of the claims trading market 
is because it is largely invisible in court records. Claims trading is an over-
the-counter (OTC) market,48 so there is no exchange that can provide 
information. The sole specific regulation of claims trading, Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e) (Rule 3001(e)), states that notice of claims 
trades be filed with the court, although no particular timeliness is required.49 
The Rule 3001(e) filing requirement applies only when the actual claim 
changes hands, however, not when the beneficial interest represented by the 
claim changes hands.50 This means that many economic claims trades are 
not reported with the court. 
In particular, two major categories of claims—bank debt and bond 
claims—do not show up in Rule 3001(e) filings. Bank debt is often 
syndicated; only the administrative agent for the syndicate (typically the 
lead bank) will file a claim in the bankruptcy.51 The syndicated interests 
(assignments or participations) might change hands, but it will not be 
reflected in a Rule 3001(e) filing. 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See, e.g., Drain & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 569–70 (noting the “formation of numerous 
distressed debt funds with assets in excess of $1 billion” in 2002); Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 
2, at 101 n.71 (providing financial figures on claims trading); Tung, supra note 5, at 1685 (noting 
an estimate of the claims trading market “as high as $300 billion” in 1996). 
 47. See Press Release, Restricted Stock Partners, Restricted Stock Partners Acquires T-REX; 
Adds Bankruptcy Claims to Online Trading Platform (June 9, 2008), http://express-press-
release.net/50/Restricted Stock Partners Acquires T-REX; Adds Bankruptcy Claims To Online 
Trading Platform.php. 
 48. There is a nascent attempt to create a claims trading exchange in the so-called Trade 
Receivables Exchange (T-REX), now part of Second Market. See Second Market, Bankruptcy 
Claims, http://www.secondmarket.com/markets/bankruptcy-claims.html. 
 49. Generally applicable laws on fraud and contract apply to claims trades, of course. See 
generally Drain & Schwartz, supra note 5. For certain types of claims, federal and/or state 
securities laws may apply as well. 
 50. See Groshong, supra note 5, at 642. 
 51. Anne Marrs Huber & Thomas H. Young, The Trading of Bank Debt In and Out of Chapter 
11, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, 1, 3 (2006). 
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Trades in bank loans are also unlikely to be visible in Rule 3001(e) 
filings because the economic interest in the loan could be separated from 
legal title to the loan due to a total return swap (TRS). A bank loan TRS is 
an OTC derivative product in which a bank (the funding bank) agrees to 
swap the total return (all interest and fees) on a loan it funds (or has 
purchased) in exchange for periodic payments by the swap counterparty 
(typically a hedge fund) of LIBOR plus a spread.52 The bank thus ends its 
exposure on the loan for the duration of the swap (typically one year), but 
makes a profit on the difference between its own cost of funding the loan 
and the payments it receives from its swap counterparty.53 
In a TRS, the funding bank retains legal title to the loan and performs 
all ministerial acts, including filing of bankruptcy claims, but the economic 
interest in the loan is transferred to the swap counterparty. There are three 
potential TRS-related transactions that would not be visible. First, a TRS 
could expire postpetition. This would have the effect of transferring the 
economic interest in the loan back to the funding bank. Second, a TRS 
could be entered into postpetition on an existing loan (unlike a credit 
default swap). And third, the funding bank’s swap counterparty could 
assign its interest to another party postpetition. None of these transactions 
would be observable in Rule 3001(e) filings because legal title for the loan 
remains with the funding bank, even as the economic interest in the loan 
shifts. 
For bonds, there will be only one claim filed per indenture, and it will 
be filed by the indenture trustee. Thus, there will be no Rule 3001(e) filings 
evident for trades in the debtor’s bond debt. Trades in claims for two large 
slices of the capital structure of bankrupt companies are simply invisible. 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Philip Nisbet & Mark Herzinger, Bank Loan Total Return Swap Primer, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING 680, 684, 693 (Allison Taylor & Alicia 
Sansone eds., 2007). The size of the TRS market for North American bank loans is estimated to be 
$75 billion. Id. at 681, 693. Banks require their TRS counterparties to post collateral to cover 
counterparty payment risk, but the collateral is usually a fraction (a “haircut”) of the amount of the 
reference loan(s) for the swap. Id. at 681, 692–93. This means that TRS are actually a device for 
leveraged investing. In recent years, up to 10x leverage has been available. Id. at 698. To 
illustrate, consider a TRS on a $10 million bank loan. If the bank’s swap counterparty wanted to 
fund the loan itself, directly, it would need to tie up $10 million in the loan. The bank, however, 
might only require $1 million in collateral for a TRS. Thus, the counterparty will be able to 
achieve the return on a $10 million loan (minus LIBOR plus the spread) while only tying up $1 
million. See id. at 697 (providing additional sample calculations). Of course, the swap 
counterparty is responsible for its payments regardless of the total return on the bank loan, so such 
leverage carries significant risks. 
 53. Id. at 684. Bank capital requirements do not require banks to hold specific risk-based 
capital for perfectly hedged assets in their trading books and counterparty risk can be covered by 
posting of sufficient collateral, which is part of the TRS transaction. O.C.C. Interpretive Letter 
No. 893 (Nov. 23, 1999), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/oct00/int893.pdf. 
Therefore, banks have extremely low costs of funding for loans hedged by TRS (which are 
perfectly matched hedges, so the difference between the swap counterparty’s period payments and 
the bank’s cost of funding—the bank’s profit of the TRS—is substantial). 
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The trades that are visible are primarily trades in unsecured trade debt. 
In large Chapter 11 cases (Mega-Cases), there is clearly an active market in 
such claims, as their case dockets are peppered with Rule 3001(e) filings. 
These trades will range from claims as small as a $40 claim by a locksmith 
(such a trade occurred in Footstar’s bankruptcy54) to multi-million dollar 
claims,55 but many are relatively small, under $1,000.56 While it would be 
possible to undertake an empirical study of claims trading based on Rule 
3001(e) filings, it would necessarily be incomplete, and there is good reason 
to believe that the market in unsecured trade and vendor claims looks 
different from the market in bond claims or bank debt. 
To the extent that claims trading has received scholarly attention, it is in 
the context of Mega-Cases,57 yet there are many smaller business 
bankruptcy cases, ranging from small businesses that file under Chapter 13 
to small cap, middle market, and even sizeable Chapter 11’s with publicly 
traded debt securities that are not Mega-Cases. We know almost nothing 
about claims trading dynamics in the medium and small business cases. For 
those small businesses in Chapter 13, the dynamics presumably resemble 
those of Chapter 13 consumer debtor cases. But for the smaller Chapter 11 
cases, it is not clear how much claims trading there is or what its purpose is. 
Not surprisingly, given the epistemological limitations on any discussion of 
bankruptcy claims trading, the debate usually operates at a high level of 
generality, lumping all claims trading together. 
The claims trading debate is hindered by this level of generality. At 
best, with a high level of generality, all we can say is that the net impact of 
claims trading is indeterminate.58 Unpacking the various practices that fall 
under the claims trading rubric is a necessary first step in advancing a more 
productive discussion about claims trading’s impact on bankruptcy. The 
following section considers some of the key variations in the claims trading 
market and their likely impacts on the bankruptcy process. 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See Notice to transfer of Claim pursuant to rule 3001 (e)(1) from A & Z Lock & Key to 
Revenue Management, In re Footstar, No. 04-22350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2004).  
 55. Burbage & Weddell, Barzel Industries Bankruptcy – Trade Debt Picture, Largest 
Unsecured Creditors (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.burbageweddell.com/2009/09/16/barzel-
industries-bankruptcy-trade-debt-picture-largest-unsecured-creditors/. 
 56. Posting of Adam J. Levitin to Credit Slips: A Discussion on Bankruptcy, 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2007/10/bankruptcy-clai.html (Sept. 20, 2007, 22:18 EST). 
 57. See, e.g., Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 89 (discussing Enron’s effect on 
bankruptcy claims trading); see generally Levitin, The Limits of Enron, supra note 5 (discussing 
the subordination that buyers of bankruptcy claims will be subjected to post-Enron); Kenneth M. 
Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts? 15 (March 2009) (Univ. of Penn. Inst. for 
Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 09-05, Nw. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-05, 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1362639 (discussing Lehman 
Brother’s decision to file for bankruptcy and the effects on government intervention). 
 58. Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 89. 
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II. THREE-DIMENSIONAL CLAIMS TRADING 
Claims trading is a multi-dimensional and dynamic market that 
encompasses trades in claims based on a variety of types of debts and 
trading motivations. The market varies on three dimensions: temporally, 
regarding when claims trading takes place; qualitatively, regarding what is 
traded; and motivationally, regarding trading strategies. As an initial matter, 
however, it is necessary to define claims trading. We often speak of 
“bankruptcy claims trading,” but what is it about a bankruptcy claim that 
distinguishes it from a regular debt claim? Answering this requires us to 
first consider the temporal dimension of claims trading. 
A. THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION: ARE BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS A 
DISTINCT MARKET? 
From a legal perspective, there are many possible distinctions between 
a bankruptcy claim and a regular debt. In an earlier work, I noted that the 
Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “claim”59 was arguably broader than what 
might be commonly thought of as a debt because it included disputed, 
contingent, and unliquidated payment obligations.60 I also noted that not all 
debts were enforceable in bankruptcy, that a bankruptcy claim carries rights 
with it that are distinct from those that are part of a debt, and that 
bankruptcy endows a claim with a relational aspect that does not exist in a 
debt.61 Filing for bankruptcy can also accelerate debts that have not yet 
become due outside of bankruptcy. 
Although there is a legal distinction between a bankruptcy claim and a 
regular debt, they are both rights to use the legal system to collect value 
from another. The value of those rights depends on legal distinctions, such 
as whether the collection takes place through state law or federal 
bankruptcy law, whether or not a claim is ultimately allowable, and, if so, in 
what amount, with what priority, and with what voting rights. Buying or 
selling either a bankruptcy claim or a regular debt is a gamble on this 
constellation of risks, but the market is concerned about these distinctions 
                                                                                                                 
 59. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), (B) (2006) defines a “claim” as: 
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, 
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or 
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach 
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable 
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 
disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. 
Id. 
 60. Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 169–70. The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of 
“debt” is simply “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2006). 
 61. Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 170. 
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only to the extent that they are meaningful markers of risk and value. Yet, 
the market import of legal distinction between bankruptcy claims and 
distressed debt depends on whether it is in a consumer or a business 
context. 
1. Consumer Debt 
Within consumer claims, there are a few submarkets, temporally. First, 
there is a market involving the resale of consumer debt as part of routine 
securitization transactions.62 
Second, there is a market for delinquent debt of non-bankrupt 
consumers.63 Third, there is a market for consumer bankruptcy claims, 
many of which were previously delinquent.64 And fourth, there is a market 
in “zombie” debt that has been discharged in bankruptcy.65 These temporal 
submarkets are further divided by asset type. Although many claims buyers 
will deal in all types of consumer debt, there are some that specialize in 
credit card debt, mortgages, auto loans, student loans or medical debt.66 
The key temporal distinction, however, in consumer cases is the 
bankruptcy status of the obligor. There is a distinct market for bankruptcy 
debt from delinquent or regulatorily “charged-off” debt.67 This is due to the 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 
YALE J. ON REG. 143, 189 (2009). 
 63. Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer, 73 MO. L. 
REV. 707, 715 (2006). 
 64. Moss, supra note 5, at 646. 
 65. This discharged debt is called “zombie” debt because there are still attempts to collect it 
even though it is legally unenforceable, making it a financial “undead.” Liz Pulliam Weston, 
“Zombie” Debt Is Hard to Kill, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/SavingandDebt/Manage 
Debt/ZombieDebtCollectorsDigUpYourOldMistakes.aspx. Debtors will sometimes pay 
discharged “zombie” debt because they do not know that the debt is no longer enforceable; 
because they do not want to deal with the harassment of (illegal) debt collection; because of a 
sense of moral obligation to repay debts, regardless of their legal status; because they hope it will 
help their credit rating; or because repayment of the debt is a precondition for receiving new 
financing or other consideration. Some courts have held that the purchase or sale of discharged 
debt, leading to subsequent collection activity, can be a violation of the discharge injunction. See, 
e.g., In re Nassoko, 405 B.R. 515, 520–21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (sale of discharged debt could 
provide basis for violation of discharge injunction); Gunter v. Kevin O’Brien & Assocs. Co. (In re 
Gunter), 389 B.R. 67, 73 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) (failure to inform the purchaser of the discharge 
is itself a violation of the discharge injunction); In re Lafferty, 229 B.R. 707, 714 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1998) (“The selling of accounts is a deliberate act to collect on a discharged debt.”); Walker 
v. M&M Dodge, Inc. (In re Walker), 180 B.R. 834, 844 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1995); In re Roush, 88 
B.R. 163, 165 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (“[T]he burden of establishing procedures adequate to 
minimize or eliminate this problem was upon the creditor.”); In re Conti, 50 B.R. 142, 146 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (“The IRS is not privileged to ignore the dischargeability of certain taxes 
because of the burden or inconvenience which it may cause.”). But see Finnie v. First Union Nat’l 
Bank, 275 B.R. 743, 746 (E.D. Va. 2002) (sale alone of discharged debt is not a collection action 
in violation of the discharge injunction). 
 66. Levitin, supra note 62, at 192–93. 
 67. Generally accepted accounting principles prohibit non-performing assets from remaining 
on a balance sheet but do not specify specific dates for which they must be “charged-off.” 
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differences in collecting bankruptcy claims and merely delinquent debt. A 
creditor in a consumer bankruptcy case only has to file a proof of claim or 
be listed on a debtor’s schedule, and, unless the claim is challenged or the 
creditor objects to the plan, the creditor will receive its allocated payment 
from the bankruptcy trustee.68 Generally, it is a passive investment process. 
This contrasts with investing in delinquent, but non-bankrupt consumer 
debt, which will usually payout only if there are active collection efforts, 
such as dunning calls and letters. This is a much more labor-intensive 
business model that results in very different pricing for bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy consumer claims most clearly visible in the pricing of 
unsecured debt in Chapter 13. 
Because 93–96% of Chapter 7 cases are “no-asset” cases,69 most of the 
consumer bankruptcy claims market is in Chapter 13 claims.70 $72.35 
billion in consumer claims were sold in 2008.71 Around three-quarters of 
the total market ($55.527 billion) was credit card debt,72 and Chapter 13 
claims accounted for around a quarter of face value of the consumer debt 
resale market.73 Whereas a dollar of credit card debt sells on average for 
10–11 cents in a Chapter 13 case, it will only sell for 2–3 cents outside of 
bankruptcy.74 Thus for consumer claims, there is a distinct bankruptcy 
claims market based on different collection models. 
The temporal pricing variations for different types of consumer debt 
also inform an important debate issue in consumer finance about the effect 
of bankruptcy recovery rates on the cost and availability of consumer credit, 
especially to the riskiest consumers. In theory, if limits on dischargeability 
resulted in greater returns for creditors, they would result in lower costs for 
borrowers and/or greater credit availability, assuming perfectly efficient, 
complete markets. The assumption of perfect or complete markets is 
                                                                                                                 
Banking regulation, however, requires that financial institutions “charge-off” non-performing debt 
after a specified lapse of time: 180 days for open-end credit and 120 days for closed-end credit. 
Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account Management Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. 6655, 6657 
(Feb. 10, 1999). 
 68. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006). This provision applies to business bankruptcies as well. Id. 
 69. W. Clarkson McDow, Jr., Protecting the Integrity of the Bankruptcy System in Chapter 7 
No-Asset Cases, http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs/nabtalkfall2001.htm 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (ninety-six percent of Chapter 7s in 2000 were no-asset cases); Dalié 
Jiménez, The Distribution of Assets in Consumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases, 85 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1471603 
(ninety-three percent of consumer Chapter 7s were no-asset cases). 
 70. See Credit Card Debt Sales in 2008, THE NILSON REPORT, Mar. 2009, at 10, 10 
[hereinafter NILSON REPORT]. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
2010] Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading 83 
 
generally problematic,75 and there is mixed evidence on whether greater 
dischargeability actually affects the cost or availability of consumer credit.76 
Given that the price of unsecured Chapter 13 debt is so much higher 
than the price of equivalent debt outside of bankruptcy, it raises the 
question of whether changes in bankruptcy law that would broaden the 
scope of the discharge and enhance the debtor’s fresh start in life would 
have adverse consequences on consumer finance markets. As long as the 
bankruptcy return (and hence the price of bankruptcy claims) is still greater 
than that of the equivalent debt outside of bankruptcy, policies that make 
bankruptcy more attractive to defaulted consumers should not affect 
consumer credit pricing. When faced with a defaulted debt, the relevant 
consideration for a creditor is the trade-off between state law and 
bankruptcy as collection methods (or restructuring the debt). In many cases, 
bankruptcy may be a more attractive option for creditors.77 State law 
collection, especially of unsecured debts, is ineffective because of 
limitations on garnishment and asset exemptions.78 Bankruptcy, on the 
other hand, requires payments to be made if there are nonexempt assets or 
disposable income.79 
2. Business Debt 
In the business context, in contrast, bankruptcy claims do not constitute 
a distinct market from distressed debt, in part because the collection efforts 
involved do not vary significantly depending on bankruptcy. Historically, 
there was a distinct “bankruptcy claims” market that was thin and highly 
specialized.80 Claims traders bought claims only after a plan was 
proposed.81 They assumed only plan vote and feasibility risk, which was de 
minimis.82 The plan was a public document, and investors looked to pick up 
claims on the eve of the vote.83 
Over the past two decades, however, investors began buying claims 
earlier and earlier.84 Now, investors trade in distressed debt well before 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 33 (1994) (explaining how markets are 
always incomplete). 
 76. Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in 
Bankruptcy, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 565, 586–99 (reviewing literature). 
 77. See id. at 602 (suggesting that Chapter 13 cramdown would result in smaller losses than 
state law foreclosure for mortgages). 
 78. See id. at 644. 
 79. See id. at 579; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2006). 
 80. Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 92. 
 81. Interview with Thomas Janover, Partner, Kramer, Levin, Naftalis & Frankel L.L.P. (July 
29, 2009) (on file with author). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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bankruptcy.85 Instead of distinct markets based on whether the obligor is 
bankrupt or not, there is a general distressed debt market with a variety of 
investment strategies based on timing.86 The segmentation that exists in the 
market is not based on bankruptcy status, but rather on asset class.87 
The lack of temporal distinction between bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy claims trading in the business claims context is important 
because it suggests that regulatory cost spillovers would be much more 
severe in the business claims context.88 Because business bankruptcy claims 
are part of a broader market in business debt obligations, regulation of 
bankruptcy claims trading would also affect activity elsewhere in the 
broader market. While there might be good bankruptcy policy reasons to 
regulate bankruptcy claims trading in particular ways, the policy analysis 
has to consider the impact on non-bankruptcy claims trades in a way that it 
might not in the consumer claims context. 
B. THE QUALITATIVE DIMENSION: MARKET SEGMENTATION BY 
ASSET CLASS 
1. Consumer Debt 
The consumer claims market is entirely distinct from the business 
claims market. It has also been largely overlooked by the academic 
literature, other than in context of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
even though claims buyers represent an important class of consumer 
bankruptcy creditors, especially for credit card debt.89 
Most of the claims traded in consumer bankruptcy cases are in 
unsecured claims, especially credit card debt claims.90 Consumer claims 
trading also occurs primarily in Chapter 13 debt because almost all Chapter 
7s are no-asset cases.91 As Guy B. Moss has noted regarding consumer 
Chapter 7s: 
If the aim of the buyer is to realize on the upside potential of the claim 
based solely on the ultimate dividend payable from the estate, the 
prospects appear marginal. If, instead, the buyer’s aim is to realize on all 
or a significant part of the entire claim by attacking the debtor’s discharge 
or the dischargeability of the claim purchased by taking advantage of the 
debt reaffirmation provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, or by inducing 
voluntary payments after the discharge enters, the prospects are at best 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.; see also Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study 
of Investors’ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 71 (2008). 
 88. Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 151–60. 
 89. For a major exception, see Moss, supra note 5. 
 90. See NILSON REPORT, supra note 70, at 10. 
 91. McDow, supra note 69. 
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uncertain, in many respects fraught with risk, and, of course, subject to the 
potential costs of litigation.92 
Accordingly, the Chapter 7 consumer claims market is much more 
limited than the Chapter 13 market. 
Consumer claims trading is a fairly concentrated industry, with ten 
firms holding over 80% of resold consumer debt (excluding sales that occur 
as part of securitization transactions) and a similar percentage for credit 
card debt.93 Apparently, concentration is much higher for bankruptcy 
claims, as executives at eCast Settlement Corporation (formerly a Bear 
Stearns affiliate, now a JPMorgan Chase affiliate) estimate that eCast and 
two other major consumer debt buyers hold 70% of consumer credit card 
debt in Chapter 13 bankruptcies.94 eCast and the other buyers purchase the 
credit card debt and occasionally other types of unsecured debt, such as 
auto loan deficiencies in bankruptcy cases, at 10–15 cents on the dollar 
depending on a variety of actuarial factors, including the judicial district, 
the judge and trustee, and account features.95 
Typically, in consumer cases there is only one trading moment in 
bankruptcy for any particular claim—a debt buyer purchases a claim and 
holds it through the case. In consumer cases, claims trading operates on a 
single basic strategy—buy low and get a higher payout. The risk of a lower 
than anticipated yield is mitigated through diversified investment in 
thousands of cases.96 
Because there is no voting in Chapter 7, 12, or 13 cases, the value of a 
claim is its payout value, but that payout value can be manipulated because 
a claim gives the claim holder standing to make motions as a party in 
interest. A motivated professional Chapter 13 creditor, like a claims buyer, 
might also strategically bring frivolous litigation to boost its payouts. 
Frivolous or not, on a one-off basis, it is simply not worthwhile to bring 
much litigation over a $3,000 or $8,000 claim. Consumer debtors, however, 
can rarely afford to litigate such matters. Thus, the threat of litigation, 
enhanced by the occasional noisy example, can result in greater payouts. 
Consumer claims trading raises two key policy concerns. First, can the 
claims purchaser actually prove title to the claim and the requisite facts to 
support the claim?97 And second, might claims trading be used to “launder” 
the claim?98 The consumer debtor might have a claim against the lender that 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Moss, supra note 5, at 643 (internal citations omitted). 
 93. NILSON REPORT, supra note 70, at 10. 
 94. Telephone Interview with Mark Jackwicz, Executive Vice President & Kwang Thomas 
Choi, Executive Vice President, eCast Settlement Corp. (Sept. 11, 2008) (on file with author). 
 95. Id.  
 96. Douglas G. Baird, The Bankruptcy Exchange, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 23 (2010) 
(discussing the benefits of a diversified portfolio over the long run). 
 97. See, e.g., In re Wingerter, 376 B.R. 221 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 98. See Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 141. 
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could result in the claim being disallowed, equitably subordinated, or 
subject to setoff.99 The sale of the claim by the lender to a third party would 
prevent the consumer from prosecuting its action against the lender in the 
bankruptcy forum, preventing the consumer from having the debt 
disallowed, subordinated, or setoff, in the hands of the purchaser. The 
lender can thus “launder” the claim and monetize it based on its untainted 
value, while the buyer remains impervious to the consumer’s claims.100 
2. Business Debt 
Business debt claims fall into roughly four asset classes: bond debt, 
bank debt, trade debt, and tort debt. Some investors will purchase claims in 
any and all classes, while others limit themselves to particular classes. 
These types of debt differ not only based on where they are in the capital 
structure, but also based on the risks that a purchaser assumes. 
a. Bond Debt 
Claims based on bond debt are by far the most liquid type because bond 
debt is a commodity with relatively fewer risks attached to it than other 
asset classes.101 There is little risk about whether bond debt will be 
disallowed, subordinated, or subject to clawback actions.102 The validity 
and amount of the bonds are not in question and the bondholder and 
indenture trustee have no dealings with the debtor that would create 
equitable subordination grounds. Most bonds are unsecured, so there is no 
strong-arm risk.103 Moreover, because bond debt trades publicly, there is 
little counterparty risk involved in the trades because of the use of large 
financial institutions as broker-dealers; there is no question whether the 
party that is selling the claim actually owns it. There is minimal diligence 
involved in a bond debt trade, and the identity of counterparties is typically 
not known, making more serious diligence impossible. 
There is also typically a rough symmetry of sophistication between 
parties in bond debt trades. Most corporate bonds are owned by financial 
                                                                                                                 
 99. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b) (disallowance), 510(c) (equitable subordination) (2006). 
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institutions, not by individual investors.104 Accordingly, bond debt trades do 
not raise concerns of sophisticated investors fleecing naïve mom-and-pops. 
b. Bank Debt 
Bank debt is commonly syndicated, participated, or both and, trades in 
slices, rather than whole loans.105 The syndications now are written with an 
eye to trading, a contrast from past practice, when bank loan syndications 
were often restricted to banks, out of concerns about the different 
accounting rules and non-banks’ ability to make further advances to the 
debtor.106 
Bank debt bears more risks for a claims purchaser than bond debt 
because it might be subject to disallowance due to clawback actions.107 
Bank debt is almost always secured, but a lien might turn out to be 
unperfected and subject to avoidance.108 There is also risk of equitable 
subordination for misbehavior by the bank.109 
On the other hand, bank claims provide a purchaser with information 
and leverage that is not available to a bondholder. Bank loans typically have 
various reporting covenants beyond what exist in bond indentures.110 The 
access to the information is hugely valuable to an investor. Thus, bank debt 
is particularly attractive, especially to purchasers pre-bankruptcy, who will 
end up with a large informational advantage on the market.111 
Bank debt also provides a claims purchaser with far more leverage over 
the debtor, especially before bankruptcy. There are many more covenants in 
bank loans, which make defaults more likely, but which offer the purchaser 
of bank debt the possibility of forbearance fees, additional security, or 
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forcing the debtor into bankruptcy by denying forbearance.112 Thus, the 
holder of bank debt, even if it is participated or syndicated, has greater 
influence over the relationship with the debtor than does a single 
bondholder. Additionally, because bank debt is usually sold in large 
denominations, if a seller breaches its sale warranties to the buyer, a lawsuit 
is economically viable and can likely cover the damages. Like bond debt, 
bank debt is almost always held by a financial institution and trades 
between sophisticated investors on both sides of the transaction. 
c. Trade Debt 
Trade debt offers even more challenges to a claims purchaser than bank 
debt. The counterparty risks, and therefore, the diligence requirements, are 
much higher.113 The defenses that a debtor might raise against a bank loan 
are fairly limited: There might be counterclaims against the bank or 
equitable subordination issues, but the validity of the loan itself is relatively 
easy to ascertain.114 This is not the case with trade debt. 
For example, a vendor might have breached its contract with the debtor 
in any number of ways. The vendor might have delivered the debtor an 
insufficient quality or quantity of merchandise, failed to deliver it on time 
or failed to perform the services promised. Any of these breaches could 
provide the debtor with defenses to the enforcement of the contract, but 
would be quite difficult for a claims purchaser, with no right to inspect the 
debtor’s books and records, to diligence. There might also be setoff rights 
based on other dealings between the vendor and the debtor, including other 
discrete contracts.115 A purchaser of trade claims has much greater 
uncertainty about how much, if any, of the claim will be allowed, and every 
trade claim presents distinct risks. 
While the purchaser can protect itself via representations and warranties 
from the seller, many trade debt claims are in denominations that make 
litigation over misrepresentations on the sale uneconomic.116 This depresses 
the market for smaller trade claims, which is already limited because of the 
higher ratio of transaction costs to value, and because small claims are of 
little interest to buyers who are looking to gain influence over a plan. The 
market in smaller trade claims attracts buyers primarily looking to capture a 
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spread, since small trade claims will probably be classified as convenience 
claims and likely paid in full.117 This means small claims are unlikely to 
have a vote on a plan,118 which makes them unattractive to buyers looking 
to gain control over a plan. 
While trade debt offers investors many more diligence challenges than 
bond or bank debt, it also offers some advantages. Bondholders and bank 
lenders must lay out 100 cents to get a $1 allowed claim.119 Therefore, their 
“cost” of a claim is 100%. To the extent that the claim is sold for less than 
100 cents on the dollar, there is an economic loss to the bondholder or bank 
lender. 
A trade claimant, in contrast, likely has a much lower “cost” for its 
claim. If the trade claimant’s markup on the goods it sold to the debtor was 
50%, then the trade claimant will come out ahead economically (but not 
necessarily in accounting), by selling at 54 cents on the dollar. Additionally, 
trade creditors are more likely to place a premium on liquidity than bank 
lenders or bondholders, all of which means they are likely more willing to 
sell at lower prices.120 For a vulture fund looking to purchase unsecured 
debt in a bankruptcy, an allowed trade claim is just as good as an allowed 
bond claim, but the likely price spread produces an attractive arbitrage 
opportunity.121 
Trades in trade claims raise concerns about sophisticated traders taking 
advantage of ingénue vendors. It is important to remember that trade 
creditors include both incredibly sophisticated parties with extensive 
bankruptcy experience (e.g., Fortune 500 companies like OEM auto 
manufacturers) as well as sole proprietorship small businesses with no prior 
bankruptcy experience. 
d. Tort Debt 
Finally, there is a much smaller market for tort claims.122 Most 
investors are not interested in tort claims, in part because of the issues of 
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proof involved in disputed claims and because champerty issues are 
particularly salient in the personal injury context.123 
3. Deal Mechanics and Documentation 
Deal documentation and deal mechanics vary for claims depending on 
asset class. Bond debt and equity trade in bankruptcy just as it did outside 
of it (although exchange-traded equity will be delisted and trade OTC on 
the Pink Sheets), and with the same documentation.124 The same securities 
laws will apply in bankruptcy as outside, which presents another variation 
in asset class.125 
A claim’s status under securities laws affects its attractiveness to 
investors.126 Federal securities laws will apply to bond claims and 
certificated equity interests, which sometimes trade as penny stocks.127 State 
securities laws might, in some cases, extend to bank or trade claims, as state 
law definitions of securities can be broader than federal law.128 Some 
investors are happy to comply with securities regulation regimes, while 
others do not want to be subject to it.129 This is another factor encouraging 
buyers toward bank and trade debt and away from bonds. 
Bank debt trades OTC using standardized documentation from the Loan 
Syndication and Trading Association (LSTA), a trade association of 
syndicated loan broker-dealers.130 Large investment banks serve as the 
broker-dealers in this market, but a number of smaller firms such as 
Imperial Capital, Cantor Fitzgerald, The Seaport Group, and Pressprich & 
Co. also compete. Because bank loans are not treated as securities for 
federal law, the broker-dealers are not subject to federal broker-dealer 
regulation, including the duty of fair dealing and the 10b-10 trade 
confirmation rule.131 
Broker-dealer pricing depends on the size of the transactions and the 
liquidity in the claim type, but is typically in the range of a couple basis 
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points on each trade.132 There is no direct contact between the buyer and the 
seller, and they receive separate trade confirmations.133 Thus, it is 
impossible to know if the broker-dealer is acting as a dealer engaged in a 
price arbitrage itself (trading for its own account and pocketing the spread 
between the buyer’s offer and the seller’s price) rather than as a broker (a 
fiduciary agent with compensation limited by contract).134 
Trade debt can also go through a broker-dealer, but its initial sale often 
involves direct contacts between the buyer and seller. As soon as schedules 
of claimholders or proofs of claims are filed, firms that specialize in buying 
trade claims rush to send offers to claimholders.135 As the website of Argo 
Partners, a firm that specializes in trade claims, explains: 
If you have received a letter from Argo Partners offering to purchase your 
claim, you are listed in papers filed in the bankruptcy court as a creditor in 
a bankruptcy proceeding. The letter you received extends an offer to buy 
your claim in exchange for the amount stated. 
To accept our offer, simply complete the Assignment Agreement and 
return it via mail, email or fax. Payment for your claim will be made 
pursuant to the terms of the offer letter you received. Argo Partners will 
file the necessary documents to effectuate the transfer with the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court.136 
Documentation for trade claims is far from standardized, although there 
have been moves made in that direction. In 2002, a number of specialists in 
trade claims formed a Trade Claims Buyers Association (TCBA) with the 
goal of standardizing “the assignment, transfer and payment for such 
claims. This would not only clarify procedures among competitors in the 
trade claims market but, most importantly, would also act to bring 
additional confidence to creditors wishing to sell their claims.”137 
It is unclear how much progress has been made in adoption of 
standardized procedures and documentation for trade claims. Trade claims 
can be subject to a range of contract defenses. Therefore, contracts for the 
purchase of trade claims typically have mechanisms to adjust for a 
disallowance, reduction or offset.138 Sellers often want to negotiate these 
terms carefully, which precludes standardization. 
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The differences in the asset classes of bankruptcy claims suggest that 
different types of regulation are necessary. Trade claims, for example, 
might require regulation with a greater eye to protecting sellers because of 
differences in sophistication. The differences in the asset classes also 
suggest that there should be different rules about transient liability with 
claims. 
For example, consider the sorely confused district court ruling in 
Enron, the most important claims trading case to have emerged in recent 
years.139 The issue before the district court was whether a claim could be 
equitably subordinated or disallowed in the hands of a purchaser for 
malfeasance done by the seller unrelated to the claim.140 The district court 
held that the answer depended on whether the claim was “sold” or 
“assigned,”141 a novel distinction that flew against the long-standing 
interchangeability of these terms in legal practice.142 
A rule that equitable subordination or disallowance follows a claim 
might make sense if there was a highly negotiated transfer, such as a trade 
claim with opportunities for the buyer to conduct diligence on the seller or 
negotiate warranties. It makes little sense, however, for a claim based on a 
bond, where counterparty diligence is impossible, as is the ability to 
negotiate separate warranties absent knowledge of the counterparty’s 
finances. While it is true that Enron involved bank debt, which has a more 
complicated situation because it trades on standardized forms, there is a 
greater ability to negotiate terms and conduct diligence of the immediate 
seller (but not of upstream transferors) of bank debt.143 A rule that makes 
sense for one asset class of claim might not for another. 
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C. THE MOTIVATIONAL DIMENSION: TRADING STRATEGIES 
1. Sellers 
A claims trade requires both a seller and a buyer, of course, but it is 
important to recognize the differences in their respective motivations, as 
well as the impact of their activity. Claims sellers have a variety of 
motivations. Parties want to get out of bankruptcy cases for a variety of 
reasons including liquidity constraints, administrative hassle, conflicts of 
interest with current customers (including the debtor), and expense or 
regulatory risk. Others wish to sell their claims to lock in a profit, limit a 
loss, or benefit from a tax advantage.144 
Additionally, there might be some creditors who want to get out of the 
bankruptcy case because they have done something nefarious that would 
cause the claim to be disallowed or subordinated in their hands and are 
looking to “launder” their claim through the sale.145 Unless there are 
grounds for an independent action against them for their conduct, once they 
cease to be a creditor in the bankruptcy, they have little to lose.146 Despite 
the celebrated Enron case,147 there is no evidence that this practice is 
widespread. Most likely, the vast majority of claims sellers are simply 
looking to disengage from the bankruptcy with no bad faith motivation. 
Preserving exit opportunities for creditors is important because it affects 
the availability and cost of capital to all businesses, especially riskier ones. 
To the extent that creditors are worried about being trapped into a 
bankruptcy, it will reduce their willingness to lend, resulting in less credit 
availability and/or higher costs. This, in turn, might force marginal 
borrowers into bankruptcy.148 
Bankruptcy claims are the residual capital market, and as such are 
intimately linked with upstream markets. While the workings of this 
relationship depend on the ease of non-bankruptcy debt collection, there are 
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indelible connections between bankruptcy markets and non-bankruptcy 
markets; with business debt, they are largely seamless. 
From a policy perspective, however, it is very easy to view bankruptcy 
as a world in and of itself. The problem is that bankruptcy is not an end in 
and of itself, but a part of the market regulation system. It is an easy trap for 
those who work solely in the bankruptcy realm to focus only on the 
bankruptcy effects of claims trading (and often only through the prism of 
the case at hand); it is harder for them to see the indirect effects of claims 
trading on capital markets, much less the causal links. Nonetheless, 
evaluations of claims trading must account for the larger net social welfare 
impacts including liquidity. 
To the extent that we believe there is value to protect in the exit 
opportunity from claims trading, it also means that we have to protect 
sufficient entry opportunities, as every claims trade requires a buyer and a 
seller. While claim purchases raise several problematic strategies, purchases 
are necessary for sales and vice versa. 
2. Buyers 
Claims buyers are a more complicated group than sellers. Every claims 
trader is looking to buy low and sell high, but beyond that, it is hard to 
generalize when and what, much less why, they are buying. Some of their 
activities are quite innocent while others raise serious policy concerns. 
Some claims purchasers buy before the bankruptcy petition is filed, 
some at the beginning of the case, and some towards the end. For example, 
there are investors who look to purchase at low prices either when a 
business is failing or early in the bankruptcy and ride through the case until 
payouts are fairly certain.149 These investors might be hoping to buy at 30 
cents on the dollar and get a payout at 70 cents on the dollar. Perhaps if they 
waited another six months, the payout would be 74 cents on the dollar, but 
the additional 4 cents on the dollar for six months might not be a 
worthwhile return for the time value of the investment. 
Other investors might not want to assume the risk that exists in the 
early days of a case when the fate of the debtor is much less certain, but 
they would gladly purchase at 70 cents on the dollar at the end of the case 
to get a payout of 74 cents on the dollar six months later. 
Some buyers focus on a particular asset class, while others buy up and 
down the capital structure, using one class of debt as a hedge on another.150 
As for why they are buying, several different types of claims trading may 
be observed, at least in Mega-Cases. 
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As with consumer bankruptcies, there are simple passive arbitrageurs 
looking to make a spread between the price they pay for a claim and the 
ultimate payout, discounted for some time value.151 These buyers do not 
appear in court and are not active in the case. They are also often eager to 
purchase very small claims because these claims will likely be classified as 
convenience claims, which are frequently paid in full.152 Similarly, there are 
arbitrageurs who are not looking to make their spread based on the ultimate 
payout in the case, but rather as broker-dealers, earning a commission or 
markup on the claims.153 These passive investment types of activity are, by 
themselves, harmless, except to the extent claims trading volume overall is 
a problem.154 
Also, there are arbitrageurs, typically activist investment funds, who are 
active in the case, appearing in court, taking part in plan negotiations, and 
litigating to improve their payouts.155 These purchasers contribute to the 
reorganization process both through their expertise and ability to fund the 
reorganization, either through DIP lending or exit financing.156 These funds 
buy in because they want to impact the restructuring strategically.157 
Sometimes this is simply with an aim to increase the payout. Other times it 
is because they see bankruptcy as an acquisition strategy. 
Claims purchasing can also be a takeover strategy. There are claims 
purchasers who look to acquire the so-called “fulcrum security”—the 
class(es) of claims that will be paid with equity in the reorganized firm.158 
Investors can purchase debt claims and end up as owners of the reorganized 
firm. This strategy is another type of arbitrage, because it uses claims 
trading as a way to acquire the reorganized debtor at a discounted price. 
Sometimes buyers will aim for the fulcrum security after a bankruptcy 
filing, but often they will get involved pre-bankruptcy, as part of a loan-to-
own strategy with a distressed company.159 
There is reason to believe that bankruptcy might allow for cheaper 
acquisitions than outside of bankruptcy. First, there is uncertainty as to 
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where in the capital structure the fulcrum security will lie. There might be 
reduced demand for what turns out to be the fulcrum security, and hence a 
lower price. 
Second, bankruptcy claims can be acquired very quietly. There is no 
equivalent to the Williams Act provision requiring a public filing if a 
shareholder acquires more than 5% of a company’s securities.160 As a result, 
a purchaser might avoid paying the control premium. This is not necessarily 
a problematic strategy from a policy perspective, but the ability to arbitrage 
regulatory regimes to gain a bargain raises the specter of companies being 
pushed into bankruptcy to facilitate cheaper takeovers that impose costs on 
other creditors and shareholders. 
There are also claims traders who use claims as a method of shorting 
reorganizations. An entity might purchase bankruptcy claims because it is 
short on a reorganization due to another investment (such as an investment 
in a competitor), because it wishes to force an asset sale, or because they are 
competitors of the debtors.161 The purchaser’s incentive in plan 
confirmation voting is to delay or block confirmation, and force a 
liquidation. 
From a bankruptcy policy viewpoint, this looks quite bad, but it needs 
to be considered as part of the larger debate on shorting, which is essential 
for market discipline.162 The possibility of parties being short in 
reorganizations is typically part of the parties being long in other 
investments. By the same token, a party that is long on a bankruptcy 
reorganization might have hedged it with a short position on a competitor or 
index. If parties are to be encouraged to be long on reorganizations, they 
might need to be short elsewhere, and if shorting is acceptable outside of 
bankruptcy, it should be so in bankruptcy. Trading strategies that seem 
distasteful when viewed solely in a bankruptcy context can have a more 
neutral tone when the interconnectedness of bankruptcy markets to other 
markets is considered. 
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1371089. 
 162. See, e.g., Arturo Bris et al., Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the 
World, 62 J. FIN. 1029, 1072 (2007) (finding “a negative association between short sales 
restrictions and the diffusion of negative information into prices”); José Scheinkman & Wei 
Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1183 (2003) (short sales 
constraints can be a cause or a necessary condition for asset bubbles and excessive volatility); Eli 
Ofek & Matthew Richardson, DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices, 58 J. 
FIN. 1113 (2003) (short sales constraints result in stock prices failing to fully incorporate 
information); Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short-Sale Constraints and Stock Returns, 66 
J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2002) (demonstrating that stocks that are expensive to short have high 
valuations, but low returns, indicating that they are overpriced). 
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Additionally, there are claims purchasers who are seeking to acquire 
information about the debtor’s operations and assets.163 The information 
might be valuable to a competitor of the debtor or to a party interested in 
purchasing a specific asset. Courts have begun to be more careful about this 
and restrict trading of parties with access to information, despite a very 
open-ended disclosure provision in the Bankruptcy Code.164 
Finally, there are greenmailers who accumulate enough claims of a 
particular impaired class to block plan confirmation.165 Greenmailers play 
on hostage value, using this blocking position to extract a greater payout in 
a plan of reorganization for their class of claims or to get bought out.166 The 
goal of the blocking position is not to force a better plan overall, in which 
the greenmailer will benefit, but to have value reallocated from other 
creditors to the greenmailer, either in the form of a direct buyout from the 
parties that have a strong interest in plan confirmation or via a shift in plan 
distributions.167 
To the extent the greenmailer uses bankruptcy’s procedural 
requirements as a mechanism to extract value from other parties, it is an 
abuse of the process that undermines essential policy goals of efficiency 
and fairness and should be cause for vote designation or even equitable 
subordination. But determining whether an investor obtained a blocking 
position for greenmail purposes or to push an alternative vision of a 
reorganization could present difficult evidentiary challenges. Greenmail 
seems to be more a possibility to be dreaded and suspected than a clearly 
identifiable practice. 
Claims trading strategies are not exclusive. A claims purchaser could be 
seeking the fulcrum security, but find itself with a simple dollar for dollar 
spread or a blocking position. Alternatively, an attempt to gain a blocking 
position might be unsuccessful, but a fallback would be making a simple 
spread. While a basic typology of claims trading is possible, we do not 
know how neat these categories are in practice. 
The foregoing discussion of claims markets and claims trading 
strategies underscores that claims trading is comprised of dynamic, multi-
motivational, and overlapping sub-markets, which raise distinct policy 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Robert P. Enayati, Note, Undermining the Trading Wall: The BAPCPA’s Affront on the 
Creditors’ Committee’s Duty of Confidentiality in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 703, 706 (2008). 
 164. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (2009) (“A committee . . . shall (A) provide access to 
information for creditors who . . . (i) hold claims of the kind represented by that committee; and 
(ii) are not appointed to the committee.”); see also Enayati, supra note 163. 
 165. A plan of reorganization must be approved by creditors “hold[ing] at least two-thirds in 
amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors,” 
11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006), and, if it is not a cramdown plan, by those requisite majorities for 
every impaired class, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8), (b) (2006). 
 166. Lipson, supra note 161, at 6. 
 167. Id. 
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concerns. Some claims trading is beneficial, and some is value eroding. The 
key value added elements of claims trading are that it allows an exit for 
parties (which can have upstream effects on market liquidity, capital 
availability, and the cost of capital) and that it allows entrance to parties that 
can bring in the expertise and financing to speed along a reorganization. In 
other words, claims trading can help with efficient allocations of capital in 
the market. In order to preserve the essential exit opportunities, there must 
be sufficient entrance opportunities and vice-versa. Thus, greater liquidity 
in claims trading would appear to be beneficial to the bankruptcy process. 
Yet, it is possible that distinctions in claims trading do not matter 
because the key issue is the impact on the bankruptcy process of trading 
volume (in terms of number of trades) and the creditor churn it produces. 
This issue is considered in the following section. 
III. ANTICOMMONS, EMPTY CORES, AND THE COMING OF 
THE ANTIBANKRUPTCY 
In a forthcoming article, Baird and Rasmussen, articulate a sharp 
argument that implicates claims trading in general, along with other 
financial innovations, as detrimental to the bankruptcy process.168 Baird and 
Rasmussen argue that changes in finance in recent years, including claims 
trading, the entry of distressed debt investors into the bankruptcy world, and 
the rise of derivatives, have created an “anticommons” problem in 
bankruptcy.169 An anticommons problem exists when there are too many 
rights holders with the ability to exclude others from using a resource and 
none with the exclusive right to use the resource.170 The result is that the 
resource is underused.171 
The collective action problem posed by the anticommons problem is 
particularly troubling, because an essential function of bankruptcy is to 
mitigate collective action problems. Bankruptcy can become a tragedy of 
the anticommons if the existence of too many claimants frustrates the 
formation of a plan that would maximize the value of the bankrupt firm’s 
assets. If a sufficient coalition for a value-maximizing plan cannot be 
formed, the firm’s assets may not be put to their best use. As Baird and 
Thomas Jackson have explained in their seminal works, bankruptcy is 
designed to deal with the collective action problem of creditors competing 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in The Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622, 624 (1998). 
 171. Id. 
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for a common pool.172 Unremedied, the collective action problem will often 
result in a loss of value of the bankrupt firm relative to an orderly process. 
Bankruptcy is thus, in the Proceduralist view, a legislative correction of 
a market failure.173 The marketization created by financial innovation, 
including claims trading, undermines some of the procedural correction by 
substituting the transaction costs of a collective action problem caused by 
fragmented and shifting creditor identities for the collective action problem 
of the common pool. 
Baird and Rasmussen observe that in the current bankruptcy world, 
“ownership interests are fragmented and conflicting. This is quite at odds 
with the standard account of corporate reorganizations—that it solves a 
tragedy of the commons, the collective action problem that exists when 
general creditors share numerous dispersed, but otherwise similar, interests. 
Bankruptcy has become antibankruptcy.”174 
Today, Baird and Rasmussen argue that coalitions are more difficult to 
form because of the multiplicity of parties and the difficulty for parties in 
assessing each other’s true economic interests.175 For the Proceduralist view 
of bankruptcy, this is an eschatological scenario that we might term “the 
Coming of the Antibankruptcy.”176 
The anticommons problem Baird and Rasmussen identify is due to what 
game theory terms the problem of an “empty core”—a status in which 
multiple parties “cannot reach a stable agreement with each other because 
some other agreement always exists that some parties prefer . . . [causing 
the parties to] defect from any tentative agreement that might be made and 
hence none ever is.”177 For any group of three or more parties, there are 
multiple possible coalitions, including singleton coalitions.178 A party will 
opt to join a coalition only if that coalition offers it at least as much as any 
other coalition.179 A core constitutes the set of possible coalitions from 
which there will not be defection. The core can be empty, have one possible 
outcome, or many.180 If there is a nonempty core, it will include a Pareto 
                                                                                                                 
 172. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ 
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860, 867–68 (1982); see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. 
Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A 
Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 
112–13 (1984). 
 173. See infra Part I.B. 
 174. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 6). 
 175. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
 176. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 
777–85 (2002) (asserting that bankruptcy is unnecessary for large corporations where control 
rights are “coherently allocated”). 
 177. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 5 n.11). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Lester G. Telser, The Usefulness of Core Theory in Economics, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 154 
(1994). 
 180. Id. at 152. 
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optimal outcome, in which it is not possible to make any party better off 
without making at least one party worse off.181 
In bankruptcy terms, for a core to be nonempty, the proposed coalition 
must offer a better deal (a plan) to a sufficient number of claimants (the 
votes needed for confirmation) than any of the other deals that those 
claimants could get. If there are too many competing deals, there might not 
be a stable equilibrium for forming a plan. Hence, the core would be empty; 
a Pareto optimal outcome would not exist. Thus, in bankruptcy, there is 
competition among multiple possible coalitions including numerous 
potential alternative reorganization plans, liquidation (via a Chapter 11 plan 
or a conversion to Chapter 7, which will occur if a sufficiently large 
coalition cannot be formed), and the sale of the claim.182 As seen by Baird 
and Rasmussen, there is an anticommons problem when stable coalitions 
cannot be formed due to an empty core.183 In Yeats’ eschatology, when 
there is an empty core, “the centre cannot hold.”184 
Baird and Rasmussen’s argument has an important implication for 
claims trading policy because it suggests that claims trading has an overall 
negative impact on bankruptcy.185 To be sure, Baird and Rasmussen make 
no argument about claims trading’s net impact outside of bankruptcy, but 
their argument draws into question the utility of claims trading. 
Does bankruptcy really suffer from an anti-commons problem due to an 
empty core? If so, is that a function of claims trading or other changes in 
finance? Baird and Rasmussen’s story is one of financial innovation leading 
to increasingly fragmented ownership by parties whose interests lead them 
away from the traditional patterns of bankruptcy negotiation coalitions.186 
The result is that there are more possible competing coalitions and thus a 
greater chance of an empty core. 
While Baird and Rasmussen’s story is quite compelling, it relies on two 
questionable assumptions: First, that claimholdings are actually more 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at 156. Presumably, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the better metric for core theory because 
of the possibility of negotiations. 
 182. We can also add to all of these alternatives variations from investment strategies outside of 
the bankruptcy that will shift the value of deals. 
 183. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 4–5). 
 184. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Second Coming, THE DIAL (1920), reprinted in THE 
COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 187, 187 (Richard J. Finneran ed., Simon & Schuster Inc., 
rev. 2d ed. 1996) (1956). The Yeats reference in bankruptcy scholarship was first employed in 
Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Corporate 
Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 429 (2006). The titles of Baird and Rasmussen’s 
recent joint opera contain more than a hint of bankruptcy eschatologies. See Douglas G. Baird & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003); Baird & Rasmussen, 
The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 176. 
 185. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 12–19). 
 186. Id. (manuscript at 43–53) (explaining “[c]oalition [f]ormation and the [p]roblem of the 
[e]mpty [c]ore”). 
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fragmented than in the past, and second, that this is causing more problems 
in forming coalitions, resulting in suboptimal outcomes. 
A. HAVE CLAIMHOLDINGS BECOME MORE FRAGMENTED? 
Baird and Rasmussen’s fragmentation story is about bank debt, not 
claims trading or derivatives. As they explain, syndication and second lien 
loans have resulted in a fragmentation of interests in secured bank debt.187 
Claims trading and derivatives play a role in this story because they mean 
that creditor identities have changed and that their interests are opaque.188 
The traditional creditor structure of a single senior secured bank, 
bondholders, and trade claimants, all of whom are long on the 
reorganization, has been replaced with multiple secured parties. In addition 
bond and trade claims are held by constantly shifting distressed debt 
investors who may or may not be long on the reorganization and who might 
have holdings throughout the capital structure.189 The result is that historical 
patterns of reorganization negotiations no longer hold.190 These historical 
patterns had an anchoring effect on negotiations that reduced the allure of 
alternative coalitions; bankruptcy negotiations had a stylized choreography 
that made them work.191 Today, there is no anchoring and negotiation chaos 
ensues.192 
Baird and Rasmussen’s fragmentation story assumes a factual situation 
that has a limited anecdotal evidentiary basis and for which there are 
reasons to doubt. Are there more parties involved in a bankruptcy now than 
in the halcyon days of corporate reorganization when banks were banks, 
trade was trade, bondholders were passive, and everyone was long on the 
reorganization? Quite possibly, but we don’t actually know. 
Fragmentation is not a new phenomenon in bank lending, as large bank 
loans have been syndicated since at least the 1980s.193 The number of large 
banks has declined because of consolidation in the banking space,194 but 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Id. (manuscript at 6). 
 188. Id. (manuscript at 22–23). 
 189. Id. (manuscript at 2–4, 21–22). 
 190. Id. (manuscript at 2–3). 
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 193. Allison A. Taylor & Ruth Yang, Evolution of the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan 
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they have simply been replaced by investment funds, including actively 
managed structured investment vehicles (such as Collateralized Loan 
Obligations (CLOs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs)) as 
members of the bank group. The fragmentation story depends on whether 
syndication is more common in current years than in the past, whether 
syndicates now have more members, and whether the syndicate members 
are now more active investors. The potential membership in syndicates has 
definitely grown as syndication agreements have become less restrictive, 
but that does not mean that there are more parties involved in any particular 
syndication.195 Rather, less restrictive syndication agreements are more 
likely a reflection of the development of a secondary market in leveraged 
loans, which more than doubled in volume from 1998 to 2005.196 We 
simply do not know whether there are more parties holding a stake in the 
bank debt in today’s median large bankruptcy than in 1990.197 It is likely, 
however, that syndicate members include more active members, such as 
distressed debt funds, and their agendas may be quite different from that of 
the lead bank.   
B. IS THE EMPTY CORE A (NEW) PROBLEM? 
Assuming that Baird and Rasmussen are correct about fragmentation, 
did financial innovation, including claims trading, produce an empty core 
problem? Again, there are reasons to think otherwise. Assuming for the 
time being that there is in fact an empty core problem in bankruptcy, the 
causal link with financial innovation is tenuous. 
Bankruptcy always features an anticommons issue and always has a 
potential empty core problem. The nature of bankruptcy is that there are 
multiple claims on the estate. Some have the potential to exclude others 
from confirming a plan, but typically no single claimant can impose an 
outcome on all of the others. Anticommons is the nature of bankruptcy, but 
it is not always a tragedy. 
Possible empty core problems are endemic to bankruptcy. An empty 
core problem can exist with as few as three claimants. Indeed, Baird and 
Rasmussen’s illustration of an empty core in bankruptcy does not involve 
fragmented interests, claims trading, or derivatives.198 Instead, it is a 
potential problem present in any multi-party negotiation. Short of 
unanimous plan votes, the core is by definition “empty” because some 
                                                                                                                 
 195. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 22). 
 196. Taylor & Yang, supra note 193, at 25–27. 
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creditors have, through their vote, expressed that they prefer a different 
arrangement. 
The Bankruptcy Code is designed to deal with these problems. It does 
not require unanimity of creditors. Instead, it allows for somewhat flexible 
classification and requires dual majorities in each class for consensual plan 
confirmation.199 It also allows for nonconsensual cramdown confirmation in 
which only a single impaired class needs to accept the plan for 
confirmation.200 
There are also contractual mechanisms that can be used to counteract 
the problems created by the churn in creditors.201 Debtors “may negotiate 
provisions in its pre-petition credit agreements which restrict the lender’s 
trading of its claims.”202 Alternatively, a debtor can employ lock-up 
agreements that commit signing creditors to vote for the debtor’s plan, 
place restrictions on their trading or require them to use their best efforts to 
see the plan confirmed.203 Lock-ups can be done in out-of-court 
restructurings or prepackaged plans without court approval.204 Lock-ups can 
also be done with the court’s approval of a stipulation that settles a 
creditor’s claim in exchange for the creditor agreeing to vote for the plan.205 
The way a lock-up agreement operates to restrict trading may be seen 
from the Plan Support Agreement (the Agreement) filed with the court in 
the Freedom Communications Bankruptcy.206 The Agreement committed 
the debtor and certain creditors to “cooperate with each other in good faith 
and shall coordinate their activities in connection with (a) the 
implementation of the Restructuring and (b) the pursuit of the Restructuring 
and confirmation and consummation of the Plan.”207 The Agreement 
applied to all claims purchased in the future by its creditor signatories,208 
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and prohibits the sale of claims by the signatory creditors unless the 
purchaser agreed to be bound by the Agreement or received the debtor’s 
consent.209 The existence of devices like lock-up agreements, and pre-
petition credit agreements indicates that empty cores might not be creating 
the havoc in Reorgland that Baird and Rasmussen fear. 
The question then is whether financial innovations over the past couple 
decades, including claims trading, have increased the likelihood of an 
empty core. Increased fragmentation of interests would increase the number 
of parties involved in a negotiation, and thus mean that there are more 
conditions that must be satisfied. Therefore, if the number of parties 
involved in bankruptcy negotiations has increased, there is a greater 
likelihood of an empty core. If Baird and Rasmussen are correct about 
fragmentation, this will add to the risk of an empty core, although the 
question of magnitude of impact remains. 
The impact of claims trading on the core is uncertain. Economist Lester 
G. Telser has noted, “[t]he larger the number of traders, the smaller is the 
range of outcomes without deadweight losses.”210 The number of coalitions 
that can be formed in any situation, q, is 2n-1, where n is the number of 
parties involved.211 Thus, an increase in the number of parties involved (n) 
increases the number of possible coalitions (q) exponentially. 
                                                                                                                 
(a) Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to limit or restrict the ability 
or right of a Consenting Lender to purchase or take assignment of any 
additional Secured Lender Claims (“Additional Claims”) against or 
interests in any Debtor or any affiliate of any Debtor; provided, 
however, that in the event a Consenting Lender purchases or takes 
assignment of any such Additional Claims or other interests after the 
date hereof, such Additional Claims or other interests shall immediately 
upon such acquisition become subject to the terms of this Agreement. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 209. Id. at 11. Section 10 of the Agreement provides: 
(a) Except as set forth in Section 10(b), each Consenting Lender hereby 
agrees that . . . it shall not sell, transfer or assign all or any of its Secured 
Lender Claims, as the case may be, or any option thereon or any right or 
interest (voting, participation or otherwise) therein (each, a “Transfer”) 
without the prior written consent of Holdings. 
(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Consenting Lender may Transfer any 
or all of its respective Secured Lender Claims, provided that, as a condition 
precedent, the transferee thereof agrees in writing, in the form attached 
hereto as Exhibit B, to be bound by the terms of this Agreement. 
(c) Any Transfer of any Secured Lender Claim that does not comply with the 
foregoing shall be deemed void ab initio. 
Id. 
 210. Telser, supra note 179, at 152. 
 211. Id. 
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Claims trading has cross-cutting effects on n, and thus, on q. On the one 
hand, claims trading increases the number of possible coalitions because 
every possible claims purchaser is an additional party. The ability to trade a 
claim means that every claimholder has the possibility of forming a 
coalition with each possible claim purchaser. In most cases, however, this 
will result in only linear, rather than exponential growth in the number of 
possible coalitions, because most claims trades are exclusive, bilateral 
coalitions.212 That growth will depend on the number of potential distressed 
debt investors, which is limited because the sunk research costs of investing 
in any case will, at some point, outweigh the benefits of diversification. 
This limits the number of investments a distressed debt investor can pursue. 
While we cannot be sure of the magnitude, claims trading adds an 
alternative coalition to the mix that increases the chance of a nonempty 
core.213 
Yet claims trading can also reduce the chance of a nonempty core. The 
number of participants in the bankruptcy negotiation process is not static. 
The number of claimholders can be divided or consolidated. The key 
question is not the total number of parties ever involved in the bankruptcy, 
but the lowest number involved at any given instant in the case before a 
plan vote, since that instant represents the point when there would be the 
least chance of an empty core and the best chance of a deal, all else being 
equal. Claims trading can help consolidate the number of claimholders, 
which would decrease the number of potential coalitions exponentially and 
thereby decrease the chance of an empty core.214 
Does claims trading reduce the number of claimants, and, if so, how 
quickly? These are currently unanswered empirical questions. But until we 
can answer them, we cannot know the net effect of claims trading on the 
lowest number of parties involved in a bankruptcy case at any point prior to 
plan confirmation voting. At the very least, there is anecdotal evidence that 
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claims trading is not causing a rampant empty core problem. As one leading 
practitioner has noted: 
The complication today is not claims trading. We’ve dealt with it for years 
and there are many ways to lock in votes notwithstanding later trades of 
the voted claims. It is very rare that the group that negotiates with the 
debtor calls up in the middle of negotiations and says it no longer owns the 
claims and you must find the new owners. In fact, I’ve never seen that 
happen. When a minority of negotiating creditors have sold their positions, 
the new owners have always followed through on the deal under 
negotiation. In fact, they purchased their claims because they approved of 
the deal being discussed.215 
It is not unreasonable to theorize that claims trading reduces the number 
of parties involved and thereby facilitates negotiation.216 Perhaps the 
Yeatsean gyre is narrowing, not widening.217 If this is correct, then Baird 
and Rasmussen’s view about the effect of financial innovation on large 
business bankruptcies is upside down.218 Rather than financial innovation 
creating a collective action problem that undermines the procedural goal of 
bankruptcy, namely resolving a different collective action of the race to the 
courthouse, financial innovation is creating a solution to a collective action 
problem that is endemic to the multiparty nature of bankruptcy. Claims 
trading might help resolve the anticommons problem, rather than exacerbate 
it. 
Such a theory is consistent with two measures of bankruptcy 
negotiations. First, cramdown plans, where a broad negotiated deal could 
not be reached, continue to remain relatively rare.219 And second, as figure 
1 below shows, the duration of large public bankruptcy cases has fallen for 
the past three decades.220 If there is an empty core problem associated with 
financial innovations in the past decade or two, bankruptcy cases should 
have started to take longer because creditor churning leads to interminable 
negotiations. Durations drop, regardless of whether one controls for the 
                                                                                                                 
 215. E-mail from Martin J. Bienenstock, Partner, Dewey & Leboeuf L.L.P., to Adam J. Levitin, 
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type of outcome (sale of substantially all assets, conversion, plan 
confirmation, etc.), whether a prepackaged plan was involved, or whether it 
was a Delaware case.221 To be sure, there are other reasons why case 
durations might be falling that could overwhelm the visible effect of an 
empty core problem, but it is hard to see evidence of an empty core problem 
at least with this metric. 
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 221. Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Delaware Bankruptcy: Failure in the 
Ascendancy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1387, 1394–95 (2006) (noting that the difference in magnitude of 
speed between Delaware bankruptcy cases and others is small). But cf. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 
184, at 461–62 (finding a statistically significant difference in speed between Delaware cases and 
other cases). 
  Jiang et al. argue that hedge fund involvement in bankruptcies, which is heavily related to 
claims trading, is associated with longer case duration. Jiang et al., supra note 24, at 22. Their 
findings are not credible for two reasons. First, their methodology significantly undercounts hedge 
fund involvement in bankruptcies because it is only able to track hedge fund involvement when 
hedge funds hold legal title to bankruptcy claims. See generally id. Accordingly, they are unlikely 
to have observed hedge fund involvement in bankruptcy claims via loan syndications (where the 
agent bank holds title to a claim), total return swaps on loans (where the swap protection seller 
holds title to a claim), and bond claims (where the debt is held in street name). Second, they are 
only able to observe hedge fund direct holdings and trades for which Rule 3001(e) filings were 
made. See id. As a result, they observe minimal hedge fund involvement in prepackaged 
bankruptcies, where there is little trading in the claims post-petition. The hedge fund involvement 
they do observe is in non-prepackaged cases, which have longer duration. Thus, their finding that 
hedge fund involvement in Chapter 11 increases case duration is driven by the limitations on the 
ability to observe hedge fund involvement in bankruptcy overall, and especially in prepackaged 
bankruptcies. 
 222. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Web BRD Lynn M. LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database, 
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm (to obtain the numbers in the graph above: submit a query 
for each year, use the default settings for “cases,” then select “duration in days” and “disposition” 
for each year) (note, the graph above was created by the author using data downloaded from the 
LoPucki database). 
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In fact, claims trading might well be responsible for faster case 
resolution, because it serves as a mechanism to assess risk and brings in 
parties with a willingness to supply fresh capital to support the 
reorganization. Claims purchasers are vigilant about the progress of the case 
in a way that an original lender with deal fatigue is not, because the claim is 
their business opportunity, rather than an attempt to salvage a bad situation. 
Thus, a pair of studies has found that the presence of distressed debt 
investors in Chapter 11 cases increases overall value.223 Absent the ability 
to trade, distressed debt investing would be sharply curtailed because of 
lack of entry and exit opportunities for investors. Moreover, the investment 
funds that purchase claims often supply the capital for the reorganization 
through the DIP loan (if they purchased claims pre-petition) and exit 
financing. The factors contributing to the increased speed of large Chapter 
11 cases have yet to be systematically explored,224 but increased access to 
capital for bankrupt companies due, in part, to claims trading, might well 
play an important role.  
C. WHAT IF THE CORE IS EMPTY? 
It is possible, however, that the Bankruptcy Code is simply not 
designed well enough to deal with the anticommons and empty core 
problems. The Code might be obsolete. If so, what is to be done? Is there 
any way to make deals stick?   
                                                                                                                 
 223. Hotchkiss & Mooradian, supra note 24, at 401 (finding that “vulture investors add value 
by disciplining managers of distressed firms”); Jiang et al., supra note 24, at 32 (noting that the 
“prevalence of hedge funds contributes to the trend toward a more management-neutral 
restructuring process, and is viewed by the market as enhancing the overall value of bankrupt 
firms”). To be sure, Jiang et. al. summarily conclude that claims trading itself does not enhance 
value. See Jiang et al., supra note 24 (manuscript at 31). This conclusion rests on a regression of 
reorganization value against the presence of distressed debt investors (as identified by the 
authors), controlling for whether the debt was purchased post-bankruptcy or not. See id. at 17. 
This regression does not provide a good measure for the value of claims trading, however, because 
liquidity is a major consideration for any investor, and without the ability to sell a bankruptcy 
claim, many investors would never invest in distressed debt in the first place. Therefore, claims 
trading must be credited with some of the benefits that Jiang et al. find stemming from the 
presences of distressed debt investors who purchased their holdings before bankruptcy. See  
id. at 19. 
  Irrespective of the interpretive problems with Jiang et al.’s regression, its outputs are likely 
specious because they are based on an unrepresentative data sampling. Jiang et al. are able to 
observe only trades in which legal title is transferred. See id. at 17, 30. As a result, they are unable 
to observe most of the trades in bank and bond debt. Accordingly, their data is unrepresentative of 
claims trading as a whole, and cannot support conclusions about claims trading’s impact. More 
generally, the data problem means that they are not capable of tracking the full range of distressed 
debt investor activities in bankruptcy, which casts doubt on all of their findings. 
 224. One factor that might have driven quicker resolutions is increased liquidity in the market 
generally, as it enables a viable threat of a sale of the bankrupt company or its principal assets as 
an alternative to a negotiated plan of reorganization. In the current market, the lack of liquidity is 
also contributing to shorter case durations as companies lack the funds for a lengthy 
reorganization process.   
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Core theory’s solution for a problem of an empty core caused by too 
many possible coalitions is to restrict the number of possible coalitions. As 
Telser has written, “[r]estricting the number and composition of coalitions 
can result in a nonempty core with respect to those coalitions that are 
legal.”225 In claims trading terms, this would mean restricting claims trading 
volume or participants226 or lowering plan voting thresholds.227 
Restricting the number of possible coalition, however, does not 
guaranty Pareto optimality. If coalition possibilities are over-restricted, 
results may be suboptimal.228 As Telser has noted: 
There is always a set of legal coalitions giving Pareto optimality, and we 
can [as an abstract theoretical matter] calculate which coalitions to allow 
that can give the maximal amount of competition consistent with Pareto 
optimality. Allowing more than this number causes the core to vanish, and 
allowing less may not give Pareto optimality.229 
Thus, core theory suggests that there is a delicate balance between 
allowing too much claims trading and not enough. What that equilibrium is 
(or equalibria are), however, is unknown in real world conditions. This is an 
empirical question, but given the state of data on claims trading, we cannot 
begin to answer it. 
There is reason to question, as a positive matter, Baird and 
Rasmussen’s story of financial innovation having a severely negative 
impact on the bankruptcy process. But if they are correct, their suggested 
reforms are relatively moderate given the problem they diagnose.230 Baird 
and Rasmussen do not even broach the possibility of limiting the use of any 
of the innovative financial products they outline.231 Instead, they focus on 
finding offsetting negotiation facilitation mechanisms.232 
As they astutely note, negotiation is the lifeblood of bankruptcy, and 
bankruptcy judges should be given the tools to facilitate negotiated 
agreements.233 Accordingly, they raise some possible tools: limiting the 
number of potential coalitions through greater plan exclusivity,234 applying 
                                                                                                                 
 225. LESTER G. TELSER, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE CORE 4 (1978). 
 226. This could negatively impact on capital markets and on the reorganization process to the 
extent it facilitates negotiations through consolidation of claimants. See Telser, supra note 179, at 
159 (“[A] general method of resolving an empty core requires imposition of suitable upper bounds 
on the quantities that may be sold by certain sellers. Such bounds always exist.”). 
 227. This raises the concern that dissenting creditors will be steamrolled. 
 228. TELSER, supra note 225. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 48–54). 
 231. This might well be the proper conclusion, but use restrictions should at least merit 
consideration before rejection, particularly given the lessons from core theory about resolving 
empty cores. 
 232. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 5 (manuscript at 48–54). 
 233. Id. (manuscript at 53). 
 234. Id. (manuscript at 48–49). 
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plan solicitation restrictions more leniently,235 reducing the number of 
priorities,236 or giving bankruptcy judges a “nuclear option” to force a sale 
as a method for focusing bargaining.237 
Baird and Rasmussen rightly recognize that these methods either create 
more problems than they solve or are likely too weak to meaningfully 
facilitate negotiations.238 Nonetheless, they resign to a credo of markets 
correcting themselves, an odd display of faith in markets given the story 
they have told of government correcting one market failure—the race to the 
courthouse—through bankruptcy’s collective procedure, only to have the 
market generate another market failure.239 
Capitalism is, as they note, “still very much a work in progress,”240 but 
that is cold comfort if we are faced with the Coming of the Antibankruptcy. 
If the landscape for reorganizations is as dire as Baird and Rasmussen 
believe, salvation will lie only in the Second Coming, a New Bankruptcy 
Code, written against a backdrop of fragmented interests, claims trading, 
and empty cores, rather than attempting to jury-rig the current Bankruptcy 
Code, which was written for a different era of finance.241 For bankruptcy 
agnostics and nonbelievers, however, we might think about some modest 
reforms to improve claims trading markets. 
IV. CONCLUSION: IMPROVING CLAIMS TRADING 
Claims trading has revolutionized the bankruptcy world, but no one can 
say for sure whether it is for the better or worse. While claims trading may 
well cause problems in the reorganization process, there is a general 
resignation to its continued existence.242 If claims trading is to be a feature 
of the bankruptcy world (and this may very well be a good thing), there are 
ways in which it can be improved. Some issues, like improved disclosure of 
economic interest in claims, are unlikely to be easily resolved, but there are 
other more readily achievable and less controversial reforms. 
The most immediate improvement that can be made of claims trading is 
improved price disclosure. Because bankruptcy claims trade on the OTC 
market, there is limited pricing information; a creditor cannot easily gauge 
                                                                                                                 
 235. Id. (manuscript at 50). 
 236. Id. (manuscript at 51). 
 237. Id. (manuscript at 52–53). 
 238. Id. (manuscript at 49–50). 
 239. Id. (manuscript at 54). 
 240. Id. 
 241. The Bankruptcy Code was written against a different financial markets backdrop, but it has 
stood up surprisingly well. The critical stresses on the Bankruptcy Code for business bankruptcy 
are not those created by claims trading, but rather those created by the automatic stay exceptions 
for certain financial contracts, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6), (7), (17), (27) (2006), and the disparity in 
creditor protections for sales, 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006), and plan confirmations, 11 U.S.C. §1129 
(2006). 
 242.  See supra p. 75.  
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what the market price for its claim is. There might not be comparables, and 
even if there are, there is no central source to see pricing. At best, a creditor 
might receive several solicitations around the same time and be able to 
compare them. Absent the ability to easily cross-check against comparables, 
it is difficult for a creditor to evaluate an offer to purchase its claim. 
Inefficiency adds to the allure of the claims trading market because it 
can create profitable arbitrage opportunities, such as between trade claims 
and bond claims—both unsecured debt with the same place in the capital 
structure, but potentially priced quite differently. There is little likelihood 
that the market will correct this problem. If the claims market were fully 
efficient, there would be only minimal profit margins. This means that the 
repeat market participants—dealers and attorneys—have little incentive to 
make the market more efficient. An exchange would provide the best price 
disclosure mechanism, but bankruptcy claims, particularly trade claims, are 
ill-suited for an exchange. They are insufficiently standardized and are too 
illiquid. There is too much claim-specific diligence required because of 
counterparty risk for trade-claims to ever be exchange traded the way shares 
of IBM are. 
One possibility would be an electronic quotation bulletin board, like the 
Pink Sheets or OTC Bulletin Board, where market makers post recent bids 
and asks, providing potential buyers and sellers with some sense of the 
market. Some steps have been taken in this direction, although it remains to 
be seen if it is a viable model. For such a system to work, however, there 
would need to be dedicated market makers in particular bankruptcies. It is 
not clear whether claims brokers would want to assume that role. 
A more feasible alternative would be to utilize creditors committees as 
a platform for facilitating claims trading, whether by simply informing 
claimholders of the possibilities of claim purchases and issues in the market 
or by posting information on claim trade prices when available. A move in 
this direction can be observed in the bankruptcy of Dana Corporation.243 
Dana’s Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee listed the contact 
information of claims purchasers on its website to help the creditors it 
represented obtain maximum value for their claims.244 
Arguably facilitating claims trading is part of creditors’ committees’ 
duties. If creditors’ committees are responsible for maximizing the return 
for their constituents as they exist at any particular time, that could be 
accomplished either through working for a better plan or by providing their 
constituents with improved immediate exit opportunities. 
These are not separate possibilities—if plan payouts look better, the 
price for claims should go up. And claims trading could derail plan 
                                                                                                                 
 243. In re Dana Corp., No. 06-10354-brl (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2006).  
 244. See Dana Corp. Official Unsecured Creditors Committee,  
http://www.danacreditorcommittee.com/content.asp?C=892 (last viewed Sept. 2, 2009). 
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confirmation and add delay, which might drive down the price of claims for 
remaining constituents. Nonetheless, creditors’ committees should start to 
consider what role they have in increasing the value of their constituents’ 
claims, be it through a plan or through a trade. Creditors’ committees may 
not be the ideal mechanism for improving market efficiency by enabling 
claims sellers to comparison shop among buyers’ offers, but they represent 
the most easily achievable step in that direction. 
Bankruptcy law will always straddle market and communitarian 
tendencies, but the Great Normative Bankruptcy Debate about what 
bankruptcy should be is of little use in formulating policy on claims trading 
realities. Instead, by examining claims trading for what it is—a diverse 
collection of practices and markets—rather than as a meme for normative 
ideas, we can better understand how claims trading affects bankruptcy and 
determine which claims trading practices should be encouraged. 
